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Most of  the empirical studies in this volume present comparisons of budget 
rules and budget outcomes in different jurisdictions.  Yet  there are important 
insights to be gained by analyzing the detailed process of budgeting in a given 
nation in more detail than any cross-national or cross-jurisdictional study can 
allow. Detailed analysis of the factors that determine budget deficits can pro- 
vide an empirical basis for evaluating models of deficit determination, such as 
the “common pool” model of Velasco (chap. 2 in this volume). This chapter 
focuses on the fiscal experience of the Japanese economy during the last two 
decades. 
Japan’s fiscal situation in 1997 was the worst of any G7 country, having dete- 
riorated  rapidly  with the collapse of the “bubble economy” in  1991 and the 
deep and prolonged period of economic recession that ensued, and from which 
recovery has been slow and modest. The deficit on the General Government 
financial balance in FY 1996 was 7.4 percent of GDP, with a gross debt of over 
90 percent. The inclusion of the surplus on social security reduces that deficit 
to 4.8 percent, but even that figure is exceeded only by Italy among G7. More 
significantly, as figure  13.1 shows, all but Japan of  the G7 countries have a 
trend from the early 1990s of improving financial balances. While gross debt 
continued to increase in all G7 countries, the rate slowed, leveling out in the 
early 1990s, but with the striking exception of Japan, as figure 13.2 shows. 
Throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s, the governments of G7 countries 
experienced conditions of fiscal stress-budget  deficits,  accumulating debt, 
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Fig. 13.1 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, June 1996. 
Nore: Japan and U.S.A.:  excludes social security. 
General government financial balance of G7,1990-97  (% of GDP) 
and increasing costs of debt-servicing preempting increasing proportions of 
the total budget. Responding to those pressures, they attempted to reduce the 
level of deficit and debt and aspired to restore a balanced centraVfedera1  budget 
in the medium term. Many of the budget rules that are analyzed in other parts 
of this volume (see the summary in Alesina and Perotti, chap. 1 in this volume) 
have attracted attention precisely because they may affect deficit levels. This 
chapter explains how the Japanese central government coped with the condi- 
tions of continuing fiscal stress in the period 1975-97. 
Analysts within Japan (e.g., Asako, Ito, and Sakamoto 1991; Shibata 1993; 
Kawai and Onitsuka 1996; Ihori 1996) and outside (OECD, Japan Annual Sur- 
vey)  attribute the improvement in Japan’s financial balance on General Govern- 
ment expenditure that took place in the 1980s to the implementation of tough 
policies of fiscal reconstruction by Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MOF). In do- 
ing so they fail to distinguish the appearance of discipline and control from 
the underlying reality. I shall argue that MOF was largely unsuccessful in re- 
constructing the fiscal system, and unable to control the growth of central gov- 
ernment’s spending, the primary cause of fiscal stress. After a brief introduction 
to the complexities of the Japanese budgetary system, and the various measures 
used to assess fiscal performance, the chapter traces the origins of  the fiscal 
crisis of  1975. There follows an account of the aims and objectives of policies 
to “reconstruct” and “consolidate” the central government finances and an as- 
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Fig. 13.2  General government gross debt of G7,1990-97  (% of GDP) 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, June  1996. 
explain why MOF failed to achieve its fiscal objectives, and compares it with 
the response of the U.K. and Canadian centrayfederal governments to similar 
conditions of fiscal stress. 
13.1  Fiscal “Smoke and Mirrors” 
Central government budgeting in Japan is complex, and the processes of 
making budgets opaque. Besides the main (General Account) budget, there is 
the Fiscal Investment Loan Program (FILP), the so-called second budget, and 
the budgets of  38 special accounts with hypothecated revenues and specific 
expenditures.  Each year there is at least one, sometimes several supplementary 
budgets. In addition, there are 91 public corporations, part of  whose capital 
expenditures and trading losses are defrayed from the main budget and FILP. 
Social security contributions  are not counted as general revenues, but paid into 352  Maurice Wright 
separate special accounts, which are, however, partly subsidized by  transfers 
from the main budget. There are, annually, numerous complex cash-flow trans- 
fers of  revenues and expenditures between the main budget, supplementary 
budgets, and HLP and between them and the 38 special accounts and the pub- 
lic corporations. There is a considerable potential for the manipulation of those 
transfers to relieve spending pressures on the main budget. 
MOF and Japanese academic analysts tend to measure fiscal performance in 
terms of the central government’s main budget, reflecting MOF’s primary focus 
on fiscal objectives and targets set for it, rather than for General Government 
as a whole. In fact for a variety of fiscal and political reasons MOF emphasizes 
the limitations of  analysis based on the concept of General Government as 
applied to Japan. System of National Accounts (SNA) calculations convention- 
ally include the financial  balances of  social security  funds. Japan’s pension 
system is a partially funded system, accumulating funds in advance of payment 
of future benefits. MOF insists therefore that the accumulated surplus should 
be regarded as a debt owed to future beneficiaries and not as a source of reve- 
nue to offset expenditures  elsewhere in the budget; and that with a rapidly 
aging population, the accumulated surplus will run down. MOF also argues 
that the conventional  exclusion from calculations of General Government of 
the financial balances of  public corporations gives a misleading picture be- 
cause many of those corporations (especially the nine public finance corpora- 
tions and  two banks,  like the Japan Development  Bank)  implement capital 
investment  programs  under  the  direct  control  of  the  central  government, 
amounting to one-fifth of the total public fixed capital formation in Japan. They 
have been in deficit for most of the period 1979-97. The exclusion of the sub- 
stantial surpluses on the social security fund, and the inclusion of public corpo- 
rations’ deficits therefore has a marked effect on the financial balance of Gen- 
eral Government so defined. The resulting fiscal deficit is therefore much larger 
and more persistent than that of General Government measured according to 
the conventions of SNA. At various times in the 1980s and 1990s it was used 
by the Japanese Government as an important fiscal weapon with which to resist 
international pressures  to  stimulate  the  economy  through  additional public 
spending, allowing MOF to claim that apparent surpluses on General Govern- 
ment from 1987 to 1991 were in reality substantial deficits. 
Leaving aside the argument about the inclusion of the deficits of public cor- 
porations, the exclusion of social security fund surpluses (which OECD con- 
cedes) qualifies the picture of progression from deficit to surplus on the overall 
General Government financial balance in the period of fiscal reconstruction in 
the 1980s. Thus defined, General Government remains in deficit throughout, 
although the size of that deficit was reduced. 
A second qualification to the perception of successful fiscal reconstruction 
in the 1980s is that the reduction in the deficit on General Government calcu- 
lated as a proportion  of GDP is partly attributable to the growth of the latter, 353  Coping with Fiscal Stress 
especially in the period of the “economic bubble” from 1987 to 1991, when 
the greatest improvement in the deficit occurred. 
To what extent was the (qualified) improvement in the overall financial bal- 
ance of General Government directly attributable to the implementation of pol- 
icies of fiscal reconstruction in central government’s budgeting? If we compare 
the contribution of the financial balances of central and local governments to 
the reduction of the deficit in General Government (excluding social security), 
the latter’s fiscal performance is superior. This was partly the result of the cen- 
tral government’s shifting the responsibility for the costs of fiscal reconstruc- 
tion to subordinate levels of government. From 1977 local government’s deficit 
decreased annually from 1.8 percent of  GDP, to achieve a surplus in  1988. 
Central government’s deficit on its financial balance increased until 1979, when 
it stood three times higher than that of local government. Thereafter it too de- 
creased annually, but less rapidly; it never achieved surplus. More revealingly, 
central government borrowing increased faster than that of local government 
throughout the whole of the period of fiscal reconstruction, contributing more 
than three times as much to the overall gross debt of General Government. In 
1974 central government’s gross debt was 16.9 trillion and local governments’ 
9.9 trillion. By  1987, before the occurrence of the bubble economy, the figures 
were 21 1.5 trillion and 59 trillion respectively. As a proportion of GDP, central 
government’s gross debt increased from 12.2 percent in 1974 to 59.5 percent 
in 1987; local governments’, from 7.12 percent to 16.6 percent. 
In the light of such evidence, how can we account for the persistence of the 
myth that MOF’s policies of reconstruction were succeeding in restoring fiscal 
discipline and control before the occurrence of the “bubble economy” in 1987 
and the onset of the deep economic recession of 1991-95? The short answer is 
that through its rhetoric and the presentation of its fiscal performance, MOF 
appeared to have controlled central government spending, an image consistent 
with its reputation as a strong central organization, coordinating multiple polit- 
ical, economic, and bureaucratic interests in the budget process, able to impose 
firm discipline and control on the spending ministries and agencies. The reality 
was otherwise. The reduction that occurred in the overall deficit on General 
Government that is attributable directly to the improvement in the financial 
balance of the main budget controlled by MOF was more apparent than real. 
We shall now show that in the period of fiscal reconstruction during the 1980s 
(and beyond) it was unable to contain the pressures for more public spending 
or to reform the inadequate tax base. The underlying cause of fiscal stress- 
the continuous growth of  public spending-remained  throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s.  The symptoms of that stress-deficits  and debt-were  exacerbated 
by  the fiscal consequences of the “economic bubble” of the late 1980s and the 
collapse into recession that followed; but they were only the proximate cause 
of the sharp deterioration that occurred in the 1990s. The roots of that fiscal 
crisis lie much deeper, and it is to those that we turn first. 354  Maurice Wright 
13.2  The Origins of the Fiscal Crisis of  1975 
The fiscal crisis that emerged full-blown in FY  1975 had both long- and 
short-term causes. With transition to slower economic expansion, it had been 
apparent for some time that large annual increases in public expenditures could 
no longer be financed wholly from the revenues generated by economic expan- 
sion, as they had been in the era of high growth in the 1950s and 1960s. Sec- 
ondly, the structure of the taxation system inherited from the U.S. Shoup Mis- 
sion after the Second World War relied excessively on revenues from direct 
rather than indirect taxation, which were more affected by cyclical changes 
than the latter. Two shorter-term factors contributed to the emergence of the 
crisis in the middle of the 1970s. First, the ratcheting up of public spending at 
the beginning of the decade, as Japan entered upon its welfare era, encouraged 
the expectations of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians, special inter- 
est groups, and the electorate about its continued growth in the future. The 
other immediate and proximate cause of the crisis in 1975 was the fiscal conse- 
quences of  the first oil crisis in 1973, which led to a sharp contraction of eco- 
nomic activity in Japan and a decline in GNP. 
The significance of the growth of public spending in the 1970s was much 
less the growth of government and its absorption of GNP, which was still grow- 
ing, albeit more slowly than in previous decades: rather it was the financing of 
that growth of public spending that caused MOF anxiety and was to create 
difficulties for the next 20 years. In 1975 the rapid increase in current spending 
could no longer be financed solely out of  taxation  and other revenues, and it 
became necessary to issue “special deficit bonds” in addition to the ordinary, 
so-called construction bonds to finance capital spending. The latter had been is- 
sued for the first time since the end of the American occupation when the budget 
became unbalanced in 1965. Thereafter deficit financing became the norm. 
The growing imbalance and widening fiscal deficit that occurred between 
1970 and the beginning of  fiscal reconstruction  in  1979 are shown in table 
13.1.  As deficits widened, the government borrowed larger amounts; the annual 
costs of servicing new government borrowing and the cost of accumulated debt 
rose steeply in the middle of the 1970s (table 13.1). By 1975 the symptoms of 
a major crisis in the national finances were fully exposed: fast-rising expendi- 
ture, inadequate revenue growth, burgeoning fiscal deficits, accumulating debt, 
and increasing budget rigidity. The latter was especially worrying  for MOE 
The anxiety expressed in the 1960s about the prospect of “fiscal rigidification” 
was  now  being  realized  as  the  fixed costs  of  servicing  the  debt began  to 
squeeze the amount available in the budget to finance discretionary program 
expenditures, themselves subjected to the pressures of the new “welfare poli- 
tics” inaugurated in 1970.  To those difficulties was added the looming prospect 
of an increase in the number of elderly people in Japan in the early decades of 
the next century, threatening an additional burden on discretionary budgetary 
expenditures. 355  Coping with Fiscal Stress 
Table 13.1  Japan’s Central Government Budget: Deficit, Debt, and Debt- 
Service, 1970-96 
~~ 
Deficit  Debt  Debt-Service 
Outstanding  Costs as % 
% Budget  % GDP  as % GDP  Budget 









































































































































Source: Budget Bureau, MOF, Japan, 1997. 
This in outline was the problematique  with  which MOF was confronted 
throughout the next 20 years. In the next section we examine the aims and ob- 
jectives of policies to “reconstruct” and “consolidate” the central government 
finances. 
13.3  Fiscal Reconstruction, 1979-87: 
Principles, Objectives, and Policies 
MOF could not embark upon policies to reconstruct the national  finances 
without first obtaining political recognition that there was a fiscal crisis and 356  Maurice Wright 
that it was not a temporary phenomenon. Second, MOF had to convince the 
LDP leadership that fiscal reconstruction was a necessary and appropriate re- 
sponse to the underlying causes of the crisis; and to prescribe a set of guide- 
lines  broadly  acceptable  to  it,  but  which  crucially  could  be  invoked  sub- 
sequently to validate  its policies  and  commit  ministers  to  them.  This  was 
achieved by the public articulation of the underlying principles of “sound man- 
agement” of the national finances. 
The basic principle was a balanced budget, which the government pledged 
to restore at “the earliest possible opportunity.” The other principles were all 
contingent on the symptoms of annual budget deficits. Two related specifically 
to the management of the economy: first, the risk of “fiscally induced” infla- 
tion, and of “crowding out” private-sector investment through the increase and 
sale of  government bonds; and, second, the costs of current expenditures as a 
burden on future generations of taxpayers, for example by the issue of govern- 
ment bonds to finance a deficit that arose from a shortfall of revenue. “Sound 
management” also required that the fiscal system should be operated flexibly. 
None of these principles was wholly novel. Hitherto largely unstated or un- 
emphasized, their public articulation, affirmation, and reiteration now served 
three purposes essential to MOF’s evolving strategy for dealing with the causes 
and consequences of the fiscal crisis. First, cabinet ministers and senior LDP 
politicians could not repudiate the implications for fiscal policy that followed 
logically from their acceptance of those principles, namely, the reconstruction 
of  the expenditure and tax system that MOF advocated. Second, in order to 
attempt fiscal reconstruction MOF had to try to change political  perceptions 
and expectations of the role of public spending in the economy. Here the prin- 
ciples provided a set of guidelines to which MOF officials and ministers could 
refer in the preparation, discussion, and presentation of  the annual budgets. 
Repetition and reiteration helped in the process of “educating” politicians, bu- 
reaucrats in the spending ministries, interest groups, the media, and the public 
to acknowledge and accept the fiscal consequences of changed and changing 
economic circumstances. Third, the principles of sound management provided 
a set of broad contextual constraints within which annual bids for more spend- 
ing, and demands for less taxation, from ministers, bureaucrats, local politi- 
cians, and special interest groups could be negotiated. There was of course no 
guarantee that in practice participants in the budgetary processes would exer- 
cise self-restraint when their own interests or those of their clients or support- 
ers were threatened by MOF policies to cut spending or raise taxes. What is 
important to emphasize here is that by signing up publicly to the principles of 
“sound management” the LDP legitimized MOF’s reformulation of the fiscal 
agenda. 
MOF repeatedly drew attention to the accumulating size of the national debt 
and its absorption of  increasing amounts of GDP, and to the annual costs of 
servicing the total of  the debt outstanding. The latter costs, it argued, led to 
fiscal rigidification; discretion  to vary  expenditures  on programs  to reflect 357  Coping with Fiscal Stress 
political priorities was being progressively eroded. The implication was clear. 
If  LDP ministers and their back-bench supporters could deliver less to their 
constituents and clients because of the fixed costs of  servicing the debt, they 
were more vulnerable politically. The LDP’s electoral success, and its domina- 
tion of the Diet had been built and then rebuilt on the politics of distribution 
to supporters and compensation for aggrieved or disaffected groups (Calder 
1988). Fears and anxieties about future prosperity were also exploited skill- 
fully by  MOF as it warned repeatedly of  the fiscal consequences of an aging 
population. 
These longer-term implications of continuing fiscal deficits and consequen- 
tial government borrowing were less persuasive arguments for LDP politicians 
than those where MOF was able to demonstrate that short- and medium-term 
effects of  “fiscal rigidification” limited their discretion to adjust the amount 
and distribution of expenditure on favored programs, for example public works 
and agricultural subsidies and support. Nevertheless, both arguments were de- 
ployed with increasing sophistication and emphasis through the 1980s to jus- 
tify MOF’s policies of fiscal reconstruction. 
13.3.1  Policy Objectives 
The main objectives of fiscal reconstruction were unchanged throughout the 
period 1975-97: first to eliminate the issue of special deficit bonds. The second 
related objective, of reducing the overall bond-dependency ratio (the propor- 
tion  of  the total budget financed by  the  issue of  government bonds), was 
broader in its intent, including not only the elimination of  those bonds but a 
reduction in the issue of “ordinary” (construction) bonds as well. The restora- 
tion of the conditions of a balanced budget that prevailed until 1965 remained 
an aspiration, an unstated premise of its policies for fiscal reconstruction. Real- 
istically, MOF accepted the argument for financing a proportion of  capital in- 
vestment by issuing ordinary (construction) government bonds. But neverthe- 
less reduction in the issue of those bonds too was implicit in its third objective: 
to reduce the size and accumulating service costs of  the total of  outstanding 
government debt. 
13.3.2  Policies for Reconstruction 
These three objectives drove fiscal policy for the next 15 years. Alarmed by 
the huge revenue shortfall that occurred after the preparation of the initial bud- 
get for FY 1975, MOF began simultaneously to search for ways to raise addi- 
tional revenue, and to cut expenditures to plug the gap. For the moment, these 
were mainly ad hoc, short-term measures, marginal adjustments to existing 
patterns of expenditure growth and sources of revenue. 
The target date for the elimination of  the issue of  special deficit financing 
bonds was FY 1980, but continuing increases in expenditures and depressed 
revenues combined to produce a sharp increase in the number of bonds issued 
to raise more revenue to cover the deficit, and the bond-dependency ratio rose 358  Maurice Wright 
from 29.7 percent in FY  1977 to 32 percent in  1978 and to a peak of  39.6 
percent the year after. In January  1979, MOF was forced to concede that the 
aim of eliminating special bonds by the following year would not be achieved, 
and set a new target date of 1984. It also acknowledged publicly that the causes 
of the deficit were structural and could not be remedied by “natural increases” 
to revenue that  would occur when  (lower) economic growth was resumed. 
Short-term, ad hoc marginal adjustments to expenditures and to tax brackets 
had proved inadequate to deal with the rapid growth of the deficit, and failed 
completely to address its root cause. The structure of the tax system needed to 
be changed to increase the proportion  and yield of indirect taxes compared 
with direct taxes, and MOF confidently committed itself to “introduce a new 
general consumption tax in FY 1980.” This provided the context and the ratio- 
nale for the launch of the second of  three such attempts to introduce such a 
tax in the period  1975-97.  The first attempt in 1978 failed partly because of 
opposition within the LDP, but mainly because the proposed tax was univer- 
sally unpopular. The poor showing of the LDP in the  1979 election for the 
House of Representatives was widely attributed to it. 
Explicit  confirmation  that  MOF was  now  thinking  about reconstruction 
more strategically was apparent in the reorientation of its main policy objec- 
tives to a longer time horizon. This appeared in the new five-year national 
economic plan Outlook and Guidelines  for the Economic Society  for the 1980s 
prepared by the Economic Planning Agency under MOF’s guidance, and ap- 
proved by the cabinet in August 1983. The hope that one of the main objectives 
of fiscal reconstruction could be achieved by  1984 with the elimination of spe- 
cial deficit bonds was dashed by the sharp downturn in economic activity the 
previous year that necessitated an increase in public spending financed by the 
issue of additional government bonds in a package of emergency economic 
measures. The target date was now revised a second time to  1990, and the 
budget for FY 1984 reflected this new concern for the longer term. Expendi- 
ture policy was aimed at securing more radical reforms of some expenditure 
programs to deliver cuts over several years ahead, for example medical insur- 
ance, pensions, and employment insurance. In the short term, the guidelines 
for budget requests for the coming fiscal year, FY  1984, were drawn more 
tightly still. Cuts in some categories of current expenditures were raised from 
5 percent to 10 percent. Investment expenditures were cut for the first time by 
5 percent. As a result, budget policy was now tighter than at any time since the 
emergence of the fiscal crisis in the mid-1970s. Fiscal austerity was (ostensi- 
bly) maintained for three successive years. 
13.4  Policies for Fiscal Consolidation, 1987-91 
The transition from the policy of fiscal reconstruction to the resumption of 
a more expansionary, looser fiscal policy that MOF euphemistically dubbed 
“fiscal consolidation” occurred in the course of FY 1987, marked precisely by 359  Coping with Fiscal Stress 
the stimulus to domestic demand provided by the emergency economic mea- 
sures introduced in May 1987, which added 5.0 trillion to public spending, and 
cut taxes by  1  .O  trillion. Fiscal reconstruction evolved pragmatically and (at 
first) cautiously into fiscal expansion. Following the Plaza Accord of  1985 and 
the appreciation of  the value of the yen that followed, Japan had come under 
increasing pressure from the international economic community to expand do- 
mestic demand to help generate more global economic activity. Domestically, 
after three years of tight budgets, the LDP was looking for more spending in 
the run-up to the general election of  1989. These measures effectively marked 
the end of the period of fiscal reconstruction. 
The fiscal austerity associated with the objectives and policies of  the ten 
years of reconstruction was over. However, despite apparent progress toward 
the main objectives of eliminating the issue of special deficit bonds and reduc- 
ing the bond-dependency ratio, the broader objectives of restructuring the tax 
system and introducing more flexibility into the composition of  the budget 
remained unfulfilled. MOF’s second attempt to introduce a sales tax in 1987 
was no more successful than the first, but for different reasons. However, the 
attempt served to politicize the wider issue of the reform of the tax structure, 
and to move it up the political agenda, paving the way for the third (successful) 
attempt in 1988. (On the politics of tax reform see Kato 1994.) The costs of 
servicing the national debt continued on a rising trend to absorb a fifth of the 
General Account budget, more than double the figure at the beginning of  re- 
construction a decade earlier. The total of debt outstanding continued to grow 
annually, and by  1987 was preempting nearly 43 percent of GNP, its highest 
ever level (table 13.1). 
The cautious, modest fiscal expansion was soon overwhelmed by a tide of 
public spending as, first, the economy entered the frenetic period of the “bub- 
ble” and then collapsed into a deep and persistent recession. Revenues grew 
strongly throughout the period 1986-90,  the direct consequence of the specu- 
lative appreciation of land and asset prices in the bubble economy. The short- 
lived period of unstable, higher economic growth provided the means and the 
political rationale for a rapid increase of  public spending. In such circum- 
stance, and with a general election for the lower house imminent, growth of 
the General Budget was irresistible. Nevertheless the fiscal deficit narrowed 
sufficiently (or more accurately, was narrowed by  MOF’s exploitation of off- 
budget resources, see below) for MOF to achieve its long-held objective of 
eliminating the issue of  special deficit-financing bonds in 1990. It was also 
able to make steady progress in the reduction of the number of construction 
bonds issued. As a result, the bond-dependency ratio fell to 7.6 percent in the 
planned budget for FY 1991, the lowest level achieved by MOF for 20 years. 
With the apparently successful elimination of  the special deficit-financing 
bonds, MOF turned its attention to the “second stage” of  reconstructing the 
national finances, a restatement of  the existing objectives to constrain the 
growth of the massive national debt, and to restore flexibility in the allocation 360  Maurice Wright 
of discretionary expenditures within the General Account budget. In the light 
of recent experience it was felt necessary to emphasize the need to make the 
budget more flexible  so that it could be used to implement countercyclical 
economic policy without the need to resort to the issue of special deficit bonds. 
The bond-dependency ratio was to be progressively reduced below 5 percent, 
the first occasion that a target figure had been set by MOF since the emergence 
of the crisis in 1975. With the ratio set at 7.6 percent in the budget about to be 
proposed for FY 1991, this seemed a realistic target. FY  1995 was set as the 
date for its achievement. 
13.5  The Reemergence of Fiscal Crisis, 1991-96 
MOF’s public confidence that it would be able successfully to reconcile the 
competing demands of an expansionary economic policy to stimulate domestic 
demand with tight fiscal policy  to consolidate the gains made in the period 
of reconstruction evaporated with the pricking of the “bubble economy.” The 
imperatives of countercyclical economic policy quickly overrode the residual 
concern with the tight control of public spending, as the economy plunged into 
deep and prolonged recession. More severe than that which had prompted the 
policy of  fiscal reconstruction in the late 1970s, it proved more enduring and 
intractable than those that had occurred briefly twice before in the 1980s when 
MOF was faced with a similar dilemma of  reconciling contradictory policy 
aims. 
The reemergence of the symptoms of acute fiscal crisis was the result simul- 
taneously of a large and sustained shortfall in revenue and a rapid buildup of 
public spending. The sharp decline in revenues resulting from the slowdown 
in  domestic economic  activity  yet again exposed  the  underlying,  structural 
weakness of the tax system, to which MOF had  repeatedly  drawn attention 
during the past decade. While it had achieved some rebalancing of direct and 
indirect taxes, most notably the introduction of a general consumption tax in 
1988, the shock to the tax system of the collapse of the economic bubble was 
severe. Revenues declined for six successive years, from FY 1991 to FY 1996. 
As they did so, the need to stimulate demand in the economy led to political 
and business pressures for tax reductions, and threatened still further loss of 
revenues. 
As  the  means  to  finance  additional  public  spending  contracted,  so the 
political-economic  pressures  for  larger  expenditure  budgets  and  counter- 
cyclical packages of fiscal measures intensified. Responding to them, MOF was 
powerless to prevent a sudden and dramatic widening of the fiscal deficit. De- 
spite this, for the moment the budgetary policies were aimed to slow down the 
growth of  the General Account budget from 6.2 percent in FY  1991 to 2.7 
percent, rather than to impose widespread real cuts. By the following year, the 
full impact of the fiscal crisis was felt. There was a shortfall of more than 5 
trillion in the revised estimate for tax revenues for FY 1992. The eventual yield 361  Coping with Fiscal Stress 
proved even more disastrous: 8.1 trillion less than that planned. MOF had no 
alternative but to resume heavy borrowing through the issue of ordinary gov- 
ernment bonds to finance the deficit. Within the space of two years, MOF had 
been obliged to resume borrowing at levels comparable to the worst years of 
fiscal crisis a decade earlier. The planned bond-dependency rate rose from a 
low point of 7.6 percent in FY 1991 (initial) to 18.7 percent in FY 1994 (ini- 
tial). The reality was still worse. The implementation of countercyclical fiscal 
policy through supplementary budgets in-year led to further borrowing still, 
and the actual bond-dependency rate was more than 22 percent. 
With the resumption of the issue of special deficit-financing bonds in 1994, 
the fiscal wheel had turned full circle. While MOF had treated some of  the 
earlier symptoms successfully, the underlying causes of too little revenue and 
too much public spending remained. But this time around, the symptoms were 
more acute, the crisis deeper, and MOF’s authority to deal with it weakened by 
its failure to constrain the growth of the General Account budget; by the paraly- 
sis of the governmental process that followed the breakup of the old political 
order in 1993; and by the progressive erosion of its own authority as the bank- 
ing crisis (and other events) unfolded in the wake of the collapse of the bubble 
economy. The fiscal consequences of that collapse destroyed the credibility of 
MOF’s medium-term strategy for achieving those fiscal objectives set out in 
the 1990 Medium-Term Fiscal Policy to rebalance revenue and expenditures, 
reduce the size and burden of the accumulated national debt, and restore flexi- 
bility in the allocation of budgetary expenditures. The budget was now less, 
not more, flexible as the growth of the cost of borrowing and accumulated debt 
exerted a tighter squeeze on discretionary general expenditure programs (table 
13.2); it had proved impossible to implement countercyclical economic policy 
without resorting to the issue of  special deficit-financing bonds; progress to- 
ward reducing the bond-dependency ratio to less than 5 percent had been re- 
versed; and the redemption of special bonds had been deferred, as MOF sought 
to constrain the pressures on the General Account budget. 
Yet  again, the vicissitudes of economic activity had exposed the underlying 
structural weakness of  the tax  system. In  times of  recession revenue yields 
were  unreliable and inadequate to  cover the increasing costs of  the major 
spending programs. The general consumption tax was too little and too late to 
address the fundamental cause of  that weakness. Moreover, it soon became 
apparent that the recession that began officially in 1991 was different in kind 
and in duration from those that had preceded it in  1985-86,  1980-82,  and 
1974-75, which were largely consequential or contingent on global economic 
conditions. 
This time round the Japanese economy proved stubbornly resistant to the 
improvement in international trade that helped deliver the U.S. and European 
economies from conditions of  recession; moreover the  appreciation of  the 
yen-the  “yen bubble”-and  the large surplus on the current balance of trade 
made it more difficult than in earlier periods to stimulate the economy through 362  Maurice Wright 
Table 13.2  Servicing the Debt of Japan’s Central Government, 1975-96 
(initial budget) 
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Source: Budget Bureau, MOF, Japan, 1997 
the promotion of exports. Ever-larger packages of countercyclical economic 
and fiscal policies, in all totaling 63 trillion between 1992 and 1995, had little 
immediate effect on stimulating domestic demand. 
The state of the national finances deteriorated rapidly throughout FY  1995 
and FY  1996. MOF was forced  to borrow 22.0 trillion  to  finance a deficit 
swollen by  the large fiscal stimulus in September 1995, resulting in a bond- 
dependency ratio of 28.2 percent, its highest level since 1980. In FY 1996 the 
planned issue of  10.1 trillion of  special deficit bonds exceeded all previous 
experience. By the end of FY 1997 the accumulated debt was expected to total 
254 trillion, equal to 48 percent of GDP. The servicing of that debt absorbed 
more than a fifth of the total General Account budget. The principles of “sound 
management”  were necessarily  sacrificed to political-economic expediency. 
The achievement of the three policy objectives-the  elimination  of  special 
deficit bonds, the reduction of the bond-dependency ratio to reduce fiscal defi- 
cits on the path to a balanced budget, and the reduction of the size and service 
costs of the accumulated debt-was  more distant in 1997 than when they were 
formulated 20 years earlier. MOF had, however, succeeded at the third attempt 
in implementing its long-term aim of changing the tax structure; more accu- 363  Coping with Fiscal Stress 
rately, it had begun on the process of implementation. Once it had secured the 
principle of a consumption tax, it was able to exploit the circumstances of  a 
continuing shortfall of revenue during the economic recession to persuade the 
coalition governments of 1994-96  led first by Murayama and then Hashimoto 
to agree to increase the rates levied. However, the benefits in the yield of gross 
revenues were offset in the short term by  the costs of financing tax reductions 
in the recession; the longer-term significance would emerge only with the re- 
sumption of sustained economic growth. 
Despite the gravity of the fiscal situation the planned budgets for FY 1996 
and 1997 nevertheless  provided for further increases of expenditure, of 5.8 per- 
cent and 3.0 percent. Not only were fixed costs rising, those for discretionary 
expenditures continued to rise as well. Limiting the latter to 1.5 percent in FY 
1997 was claimed by the Government and MOF as a sign of new fiscal auster- 
ity. Whether the budget for FY 1998 will mark the beginning of a new realism 
in the control of public spending promised in PM Hashimoto’s vision of fiscal 
reform will not be apparent for some time to come. There is a strong sense of 
dkji  vu in his earlier declaration of FY 1997 as the first year of fiscal reconstruc- 
tion. 
13.6  Fiscal Reconstruction: Illusion and Reality 
How successful was MOF in its attempts to reconstruct the fiscal system af- 
ter 1975?  We look first at its claim to have made substantial progress toward the 
achievement of its policy aims by the end of the 1980s using its own preferred 
performance indicators, and then contrast that apparent progress with the under- 
lying reality. 
13.6.1  Raising Revenue 
MOF’s success in narrowing the fiscal gap in the period of fiscal reconstruc- 
tion was partly the result of  the buoyancy of revenues in  conditions of  sus- 
tained,  albeit  modest,  economic growth, but  also  partly  due  to  marginal 
changes in the tax  structure and in tax rates and thresholds. Its longer-term 
aim to change the balance of  direct to indirect taxation was  almost wholly 
unsuccessful. Even the substantial increase in indirect taxes resulting from the 
introduction of a national consumption tax in 1988 did little more in the early 
1990s than reverse the trend of increasing dependence on direct tax revenues, 
and to restore the 2.5:  1 ratio that obtained in the late 1970s. In reality, the ratio 
was closer to 4: 1, if we take the net tax revenues available (after the hypotheca- 
tion of revenues to local governments) to finance the General Account budget. 
Finally, while the burden of  national taxes as a proportion of  both national 
income and GDP increased marginally year by  year,  the Japanese electorate 
remained lightly taxed compared with other G7 countries in the mid- 1980s. 
Only the United States had a lower ratio than Japan. 
As the economy moved into deep recession, total revenues fell for the first 364  Maurice Wright 
Table 13.3  Japan’s Central Government Debt Outstanding, 1975-95 
(settled budget) 
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Source: Budget Bureau, MOF, Japan, 1997. 
time for over 25 years in FY 1992; tax revenues declined for six successive 
years. Without the revenues  from the new consumption tax, the disastrous 
shortfall would have been still worse. 
13.6.2  The Fiscal Deficit and Government Borrowing 
MOF twice failed to achieve its main  aim of  eliminating special  deficit 
bonds, succeeding on the third attempt in 1990. Their reissue in 1994 and their 
continuation thereafter represented a humiliating failure of MOF’s reconstruc- 
tion policies. It achieved steady progress in reducing the bond-dependency ra- 
tio, partly the result of improving control of total expenditure in the General 
Account budget and some modest success in revenue raising, but did not suc- 
ceed in reducing it to less than 5 percent by the prescribed target date of  1995. 
Although it had come close to doing so in  1991, thereafter the ratio moved 
sharply upward. Both the size of the accumulated debt and the annual cost of 
servicing it grew inexorably through almost the whole of the period (tables 
13.2 and 13.3). Debt outstanding during the period 1975-96  rose from a total 
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Fig. 13.3  Japan’s fiscal rigidity: The squeeze on program expenditures in the 
central government budget, 1965-96  (initial budget) 
from below 10 percent to nearly 50 percent. In the period of fiscal reconstruc- 
tion, the volume of  debt doubled, rising as a proportion of  GDP from 31.5 
percent to 42.7 percent. Throughout more than a decade of “fiscal reconstruc- 
tion” and “consolidation,” debt-service costs continued to absorb a fifth or 
more of the total General Account budget, exerting a considerable and contin- 
uous squeeze on discretionary expenditures. “Fiscal rigidification” increased 
throughout the whole of the period 1975-96 (fig. 13.3). 
13.6.3  Restraining the Growth of Public Expenditure 
MOF’s objective for public spending was set and constantly reaffirmed only 
in the broadest terms: to restrain the growth of public expenditures as much as 
possible. No numerical targets were prescribed, nor dates for the achievement 
of  some desirable state of  restraint. Assessment of  performance is therefore 
more difficult to make, and is to a large extent inferred from the various time- 
series data that accompanied the presentation of  the budget, and in MOF’s 
selection of preferred performance indicators. 
MOF claimed to have controlled the growth of expenditure in the General 
Account budget for much of the period of fiscal reconstruction and consolida- 
tion. While planned (initial) expenditure increased in every year from 1975 
to 1995, the annual rate of increase slowed, especially in the period of fiscal 
reconstruction, declining steadily from a peak of 24.5 percent in 1975 to reach 
standstill in  1987. Thereafter, the economic growth of  the bubble allowed, 366  Maurice Wright 
and the conditions of recession which followed obliged, MOF to increase pub- 
lic spending substantially, and the annual percentage changes moved upward 
once again. 
While after 1981 MOF managed to reduce only marginally the proportion 
of GDP absorbed by the General Account budget as a whole, its focus on the 
narrower definition of  General Expenditure (excluding debt and other fixed 
costs) showed a much larger reduction in the GDP ratio from 12.6 percent in 
1980 to 8.6 percent in 1995. The latter, it emphasized, represented “less than 
67% of the FY 1980 peak,” approximately the same proportion as that of FY 
1970. The inference that MOF wished to be drawn was clear: it had returned 
the public finances to the status quo ante that prevailed before the era of wel- 
fare spending began. That congratulatory self-assessment of its achievement 
in restraining the growth of public spending in the period of fiscal reconstruc- 
tion is subject to qualification. First, it was able to make only small cuts in 
planned General Expenditure for a brief period; no such cuts were made in the 
totals for the General Account budget as a whole. Even that apparent restraint 
of the growth of  General Expenditure is less impressive when the outcome 
(“settled”) rather than planned (“initial”) expenditure is measured (fig. 13.4). 
This shows that MOF was much less successful in controlling expenditure de- 
mands and pressures in-year than in the budget-making processes preceding 
the planned initial budget. This is partly because it was more willing to acqui- 
esce in some of the demands for additional spending financed in supplemen- 
tary budgets that were not subject to the strict controls of budget ceilings and 
guidelines and partly because the pressures to stimulate the economy in-year 
often proved irresistible. Thus the real cuts in the total of General Expenditure 
claimed for five successive years in the mid- 1980s were cuts in planned expen- 
diture that MOF was unable to deliver, in all but one of those years. Second, 
reductions in the General Expenditure/GDP ratio were achieved more as a re- 
sult of the growth of GDP than a reduction of the level of General Expenditure. 
In such circumstances public spending can continue to rise (as it did), while 
simultaneously absorbing a smaller proportion of GDP. That combination was 
significant in the politics of the budgetary process in the period of fiscal recon- 
struction, allowing MOF to accommodate political-bureaucratic pressures for 
more spending without apparently sacrificing its fiscal objectives, measured by 
the General Expenditure/GDP ratio. 
13.6.4  Manipulating Budgets and Special Accounts 
and Managing the Presentation 
MOF’s claimed success in restraining the growth of  public spending was 
only partly the result of the implementation of policies of tighter control, most 
notably in more tightly drawn guidelines for budget requests. It was mainly 
the result of the effective manipulation of revenues and expenditures between 
the General Account budget, FILP (“the second budget”), and the 38 special 














Fig. 13.4  The growth of Japan's central government budget, 1975-96 
(settled budget) 
Note: 1995, revised budget; 1996, initial budget. GDP 1995, estimate; 1996, forecast. Solid bars 
are program expenditures;  open bars are budget including program expenditures. 
There were three main budgetary stratagems designed to relieve pressure on 
the General Account budget. First, MOF exploited the statutory provision for 
the "carry-forward" of surplus revenues at the end of the financial year to defer 
redemption of  the national debt. In  1982 and for eight consecutive years it 
suspended the statutory requirement of the fixed-rate appropriation from the 
General Account budget to the National Debt Consolidation Fund. Payments 368  Maurice Wright 
Table 13.4  MOF’s Deferred Liquidation of Japan’s  National Debt, 1982-96 
(settlement-trillion  yen) 
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were resumed in FY 1990, but suspended again from 1993 to 1995. From time 
to time MOF also suspended the transfer to the fund of that surplus on the 
settlement of the General Account budget, the legislation permitting the prior- 
ity of the allocation of that surplus to general-purpose funds over that of debt 
redemption. By these means throughout almost the whole of the period of fis- 
cal reconstruction and consolidation MOF was able to relieve some of the pres- 
sures on the General Account budget by suspending the statutory arrangements 
for the liquidation of a part of the national debt by fixed-rate appropriations 
from the budget.  The resulting “savings”  from the suspension of the fixed- 
rate transfer alone were considerable, averaging annually between  1.5 and 2.5 
trillion yen throughout the period of fiscal reconstruction (table 13.4). Added 
to other fixed costs in the budget, they would have had the effect of further 
squeezing the amount available for discretionary expenditures and hence ex- 
acerbating “fiscal rigidification”; or, if not offset, would have resulted in larger 
budget  totals.  Faced with the prospect  of  massive  and recumng annual re- 
demption costs as the (mainly ten-year) special deficit bonds issued in the crisis 
of  1975 matured, MOF began “refinancing”  in FY 1984. From time to time 
MOF also reduced the proportion of nationally collected taxes statutorily as- 
signed as hypothecated revenues to local governments, achieving a temporary 
reduction in the total of fixed costs in the budget. 
Reducing the scale of the fixed costs, either that of the local assigned taxes 
or  the debt redemption, or both was thus a very effective means of  “cutting” 
public expenditure. It was also a useful means of partly financing the additional 369  Coping with Fiscal Stress 
expenditures in supplementary budgets. Suspending the arrangements for re- 
deeming the national debt had the further short-term advantage for MOF, that 
(unlike the manipulation of local assigned taxes and some other “temporary 
special measures” for postponing payments) it was not required to make up 
repayments in subsequent years. But such suspension contributed to longer- 
term difficulties. MOF’s  dilemma was  that  short-term budget reductions to 
achieve fiscal reconstruction were purchased at the expense of  longer-term 
costs: unredeemed debt imposed a burden on future generations, a further ex- 
ample of the triumph of expediency over the principle of “sound management” 
of the national finances. 
The second budget stratagem derived from the privatization of NIIT in 1985, 
which provided MOF with another potential source of funds to relieve pressure 
on the General Account budget. Funds derived from the sale of  shares were 
used in part to provide interest-free loans totaling 1.3 trillion per annum for 
specified projects of  capital investment for the three years  1986-88.  Those 
resources helped to relieve fiscal pressure on the General Account budget by 
enabling MOF to reduce expenditure on the public works programs financed 
through it: at the same time it provided a short-term “cost-free’’ means of sus- 
taining support for the public works program as a whole, as the LDP wanted. 
For example, in FY 1988, a preelection year, general public works expenditure 
was increased by over 20 percent compared with the previous year. 
Loans to finance the special capital investment projects through the “NTT 
scheme” had ultimately to be repaid from the General Account budget to the 
Special Account for National Debt Consolidation. MOF began to do so, just 
as the revenues on the General Account began to deteriorate as a result of the 
recession, thus exacerbating the emerging fiscal crisis. 
13.6.5  The Manipulation of Special Accounts and FILP 
The third budgetary stratagem involved the manipulation of cash flows be- 
tween the General Account budget and other “off-budget’’ sources. From time 
to time during the period of fiscal reconstruction, MOF suspended some statu- 
tory annual payments from the General Account budgets into various special 
accounts, most notably those for welfare insurance and for national pensions. 
At the end of  FY  1996 MOF estimated the size of  these and other “hidden 
debts” that had accumulated from previous manipulations at 16 trillion yen, 
excluding the long-term debt of  the privatized Japanese National Railways, 
27 trillion. 
More significant even than those “special temporary measures,” MOF used 
FILP, supplementary budgets, and some of the 38 special accounts as perma- 
nent alternative sources of “off-budget’’ funding for some public expenditure 
programs. The financing of public works programs is a classic example of illu- 
sion and reality in Japanese budgeting. The “headline” totals for public works 
in the planned General Account budget show a decline from annual increases 
of over 20 percent before 1979 to a position of standstill and then reduction of 370  Maurice Wright 
about 2.5 percent per annum in the period of  fiscal reconstruction. In reality 
the programs enjoyed continuous and substantial growth of between 50 and 
100 percent between 1980 and 1996, financed through supplementary budgets, 
FILP, and ad hoc temporary schemes of investment. A similar phenomenon is 
observable in the budget allocations for small businesses. 
FILP provided the main financial support for housing construction and loans 
for house purchase, and for agricultural infrastructure. By FY 1994 the govern- 
ment’s housing program was financed mainly “off-budget’’ through FILP; at 
13.205 trillion it was more than 12 times the share borne by the General Ac- 
count budget. The total value of those and other less obvious substituted funds 
is impossible to calculate; but had the General Account budget been obliged 
to fund a greater share of the housing program and other public works projects 
and capital development schemes financed by FILP and designed to improve 
“social overhead capital,” several trillion yen would have been added annually 
to the General Account budget through the period of fiscal reconstruction, and 
beyond. Besides the “second budget,” MOF also used some special accounts 
as a substitute for the General Account budget to fund some kinds of capital 
development, for example the special accounts for road construction, hospitals, 
and schools. The validity of this growing practice was even more questionable 
and questioned than its exploitation of the potential of FILP. In short, as a result 
of these and other “temporary special measures,” and the budget stratagems 
mentioned earlier, MOF was able to set each year a much smaller aggregate 
for the General Account budget, borrow less to cover a smaller deficit, and re- 
cord and present apparent progress toward its policy objectives. One effect of 
the substitution of FILP for the General Account budget was that FILP grew 
faster and absorbed a rising share of GDP. By  1996 it was two-thirds the size 
of the General Account budget. 
13.7  Explaining MOF’s Failure 
For most of the period  1975-97, Japan had a stable, one-party, right-wing 
majority government, and a centralized budgetary system. Crucially, it had a 
“strong” Ministry of Finance with a formidable combination of formal consti- 
tutional and legal powers to raise taxes, control budget and off-budget expendi- 
tures, and regulate financial and monetary policies. It possessed hierarchical, 
organizational, and informational resources unmatched by any other ministry 
or agency; it was committed to the principle of a balanced budget and “sound 
financial management”; it prescribed and progressively tightened guidelines 
for determining the size of  the budget and the relative priority of spending 
programs and set budget ceilings for each ministry and agency. Such a combi- 
nation of institutional variables would appear to be favorable to the avoidance 
of fiscal stress, or to the relief of its symptoms. Yet as we have shown, MOF 
was largely unsuccessful in reconstructing the fiscal system and achieving its 
policy aims of reducing the deficit and level of accumulated debt. Why was an 371  Coping with Fiscal Stress 
apparently “strong” Ministry of Finance unable, unwilling, or frustrated in its 
attempts to implement agreed policies to constrain the growth of public spend- 
ing, the main cause of fiscal stress? 
The aging of  the population, the “yoke of prior commitments,” and unsus- 
tainable rates of growth in debt, factors that help to explain the failure of  in- 
dustrialized countries to control long-term fiscal policy (Steuerle and Kawai 
1996), all contributed to the increasing pressures in the budgetary system for 
more public spending. While they made it more difficult to restrain the growth 
of demand-led programs such as pensions, social security, and health and wel- 
fare programs for the elderly, and to cut back existing spending commitments 
in other programs, none was  a major cause of  MOF’s failure to control the 
growth of public spending. There were five main factors. First, MOF’s failure 
to win LDP politicians and business groups to its cause of  radical tax reform 
until the late 1980s left it with an inadequate revenue base in an era in which 
a “decelerated economy” generated insufficient “natural increases” of  reve- 
nues to accommodate the double burden of inescapable fixed costs and irresist- 
ible discretionary expenditures without recourse to regular heavy borrowing. 
The consequential costs of  servicing the accumulating debt exacerbated that 
difficulty. Second, throughout the whole of  the period  1975-97  MOF was 
faced with the dilemma of trying to reconcile the contradictory aims of  eco- 
nomic policy, which frequently dictated the need for increased public spending 
and tax cuts (often in response to international pressures) to stimulate the econ- 
omy with the narrower fiscal aims of  reconstruction. The need to do so on 
several occasions in the period  1975-97  meant that that spending imperative 
dominated much of the period. It helps to explain and justify why faced with 
the conflicting policy aims, MOF resorted to temporary expedients, and the 
budget stratagems and manipulations mentioned earlier. While MOF was able 
to emerge from short bouts of countercyclical spending with its objectives for 
fiscal reconstruction still realistically attainable, even if progress toward them 
was deferred or delayed, as happened on three occasions for example with the 
target date set for the elimination of special deficit bonds, it could not reconcile 
them with the rapid, huge expansion of the General Account budget and FILP 
that the prolonged recession made inevitable. 
The third factor inhibiting the effectiveness of its policies for fiscal recon- 
struction was the need to try to reconcile their implementation with the often 
conflicting political-electoral strategic aims of  the LDP designed to sustain 
itself in power. Through government and party organizations, the LDP had 
begun to play a more active and interventionist role in policymaking generally 
from the early 1970s.  The party was incorporated into the budgetary processes, 
both formally through such structures as the functional committees of its Pol- 
icy Affairs Research Council, and informally through the intervention of senior 
party officials and members of  special policy tribes (zoku). By  such means 
the interests of the party and their clients were accommodated directly or by 
bureaucratic “anticipated reactions.”  Spending programs for public  works, 372  Maurice Wright 
small businesses, and agriculture financed both through the General Account 
budget and FILP, implemented locally by local governments, and both locally 
and regionally  through the aegis of  Public Finance Corporations, provided a 
source of patronage and clientelistic distributive politics for the LDP, helping 
to nourish  and  sustain  Dietmen’s personal  electoral-constituency  networks. 
While the LDP acquiesced in the introduction of tougher budget guidelines in 
the mid- 1980s, their effectiveness was tempered in practice by the exploitation 
of  spending loopholes provided  by  the exemption of  priority  programs, and 
ad hoc dispensations for public investment and public works, and agricultural 
infrastructure and subsidies. These provided it with the means to continue to 
distribute substantial political favors and benefits in the outputs of expenditure 
programs, and to frustrate MOF’s policies for fiscal reconstruction. 
A transparent budget process is an oxymoronic concept. But even by con- 
ventional standards, Japan’s is remarkably complex, opaque, and labyrinthine. 
However, the lack of transparency was not a major factor in the explanation of 
the continuance of  deficits and debt. The underlying reality of  Japan’s fiscal 
situation was no secret. MOF did not conceal the details of its annual budget 
stratagems and manipulation; the size and composition of  the “hidden debt” 
was public knowledge. More significantly, neither the LDP’s own back-bench 
supporters nor the main opposition parties in the Diet were disposed to argue 
for less spending or more taxation to reduce the level of deficit and debt. In- 
deed, the wilder demands of the former were kept in check by the LDP leader- 
ship; the (then) Japan Socialist Party used its position as the official opposition 
in the lower house from time to time to obstruct the passage of budget bills as 
a means of extracting spending concessions from the government. While there 
was some support among Diet parties for clean government, there was none 
of  any significance for smaller government. It is unlikely  therefore that more 
transparency in the budget processes, for example by involving legislators in 
the determination of the size of the budget(s)  and its distribution, or in the 
prescription of budget guidelines and targets, would have checked the growth 
of public spending. 
The fourth factor was the nature of  the budgetary process, through which 
the aggregate budget total was determined, and its distribution negotiated be- 
tween the spending ministries and MOF’s Budget Bureau. The aggregate or 
“ceiling” for the General Account budget and for FILP was set by MOF after 
discussion with senior LDP politicians and ministers; throughout the whole of 
the period 1975-97,  even at times of crisis, the planned aggregate was always 
greater than that of the preceding fiscal year. The only attempt at a planned cut, 
in FY 1995, was made possible only by suspending the statutory payment of 
national  debt  redemption.  Even  so, the  outcome total  was  several  trillion 
greater than that planned. Top-down limits are a necessary condition of effec- 
tive control of  spending, but as Japan’s experience shows, they are not suffi- 
cient. The “ceiling” for each ministry’s budget was negotiated with the Budget 
Bureau, together with the distribution of new money allocated to priority pro- 373  Coping with Fiscal Stress 
grams. Although the prescription of budget guidelines nominally limited the 
amount of spending on each program, in practice categories of exception and 
exemption provided both the opportunity and incentive for ministers and their 
officials to argue for more spending in their annual negotiations with the Bud- 
get Bureau. Crucially, the budget guidelines did not apply to supplementary 
budgets, which provided a further annual opportunity for spending ministries 
to argue for more public spending. 
Fifth, MOF is very much less powerful in the budget processes than is com- 
monly supposed, or appears from an inspection of formal budget institutions 
and arrangements. The latter provide the basis of the framework within which 
budget decisions are made, but a more complete and informed guide to how 
and why particular budget outcomes occur requires an analysis of the informal 
politics  of  the budgetary  process, the interaction  among the participants  in 
those processes-the  roles and strategies of ministers, party officials, bureau- 
crats, and special interest groups, and the unwritten rules of  the game that 
regulate their behavior in informal structures such as policy networks (Wright 
1991 ;  Thain and Wright 1995).  As in the United Kingdom and Canada, MOF’s 
exercise of the formal discretionary authority vested in it by the constitution 
and by statute is constrained in practice by the exercise of countervailing dis- 
cretionary power by other participants. Like the Treasury and the Department 
of Financemreasury Board, MOF is locked into a system of  mutually con- 
strained power relationships, mainly with the LDP and the spending ministries, 
and rarely able to impose its constitutional and hierarchical authority on them 
and other participants, or to implement a directive strategy for determining the 
budget aggregate and its distribution. The paradigm of the politics of  public 
spending is “negotiated discretion” (Thain and Wright 1995). 
Finally, compared with other G7 countries, “how to pay for it” questions 
have not thus far been a central concern of the budgetary processes. Maturity 
in the public sector has developed more slowly, partly because experience of 
“welfare spending” came much later, and partly because of  the tradition of 
high economic growth generating substantial revenue surpluses (Steuerle and 
Kawai 1996). 
13.8  Coping with Fiscal Stress 
MOF’s  pragmatic  and  expedient  response  to  continuous  fiscal  stress 
throughout the period of fiscal reconstruction and beyond was understandable 
and from its perspective  politically  rational.  By exploiting the potential  of 
FILP as a “second budget”; by using it and several special accounts as alterna- 
tive sources of finance to the General Account budget; by suspending statutory 
payments, by temporary “borrowings” and the manipulation of  cash flows- 
by all these short-term expedients MOF was able to keep the fiscal ship afloat 
through the troubled waters of the early  1980s, and allowed it to present an 
illusion of public spending control consistent with apparent steady progress 374  Maurice Wright 
toward the achievement of its main policy objectives. It not only avoided (or 
at least postponed) the breakdown of the fiscal system: it reasserted and reiter- 
ated the principles of “sound management.” Without the annual ceiling on the 
General Account budget and the imposition of ceilings on ministerial budgets, 
public  spending  would have grown at a still faster rate.  Guidelines  for de- 
termining the relative priority of competing spending programs at least obliged 
ministers and LDP back-benchers to talk the language of priority and the allo- 
cation of scarce(r) resources, even if in practice the application of those guide- 
lines was less rigorous than MOF intended. In a period in which the internal 
spending pressures that resulted  from the expansion of  welfare spending in 
the 1970s was fueled by  the expectations of LDP politicians, their clients, and 
aggrieved groups of still more public spending and lower taxes, this was no 
small achievement. 
That said, any hopes that it had of making the surface appearance consistent 
with the underlying reality-in  short to make a reality of  reconstructing the 
fiscal system according to the principles of “sound management”-were  de- 
stroyed by the fiscal effects of the bubble economy that ratcheted up levels of 
public spending insupportable by the recent historic trends of GDP growth and 
contingent revenue yields; and by  the plunge into deep and prolonged eco- 
nomic recession in the years that followed. Whatever progress had been made 
was slowed, then halted, and ultimately reversed as the fiscal imperative of the 
recession dictated  massive amounts of borrowing to finance countercyclical 
spending, and tax cuts and concessions. Any gains that accrued from imple- 
mentation of the policies of reconstruction and consolidation evaporated. The 
status quo ante of  1975 was quickly restored. But this time around the fiscal 
crisis was much deeper and enveloped FILP, now swollen to two-thirds the size 
of the General Account budget and experiencing its own crisis of identity in 
the era of deregulated interest rates and liberalized capital markets. Fiscal re- 
construction in the second half of the 1990s now had a much broader connota- 
tion than the earlier concern with the tax structure, the budget system, and the 
growth of the General Account budget: it touched all parts of the fiscal system. 
The crisis of the national finances was itself both a contributory caust: and a 
symptom of  a much broader crisis of  the state, in which its role and that of 
the political, bureaucratic, and economic institutions that sustained it were the 
subject of sustained critical debate. 
Were other G7 governments more successful than those of Japan in the pe- 
riod  1975-97  in achieving their objectives to relieve stress and bouts of acute 
crisis? To  stem the tide of  rising  expenditure  through the  1980s and  1990s, 
both U.K. and Canadian governments responded annually with budget policies 
designed to exert continuous downward pressure on the size and cost of depart- 
mental expenditures programs. In practice, in both  countries until  the early 
1990s, bottom-up pressures for more spending regularly overwhelmed the top- 
down planned  totals, as they  did in Japan. In the United Kingdom,  central 
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dustries, grew in real terms by  about a third between  1979 and 1992 (Thain 
and Wright 1995). The trend of General Government expenditure, apart from 
a dip in spending in the mid-1970s and the late  1980s, shows a steady and 
continuous rise in real spending. Conservative governments from 1979 failed 
to slow the trend rate of growth, roughly 2 percent per annum in real terms. As 
in Japan, they were able to achieve neither the heroic objectives set in 1980, 
nor the less ambitious revised ones set in the mid-1980s. What was stress in 
the second half of the 1980s collapsed into crisis after the general election of 
1992, requiring urgent action to cap the budget aggregate and to change the 
budget machinery and processes for determining and delivering it. Despite 
that, public spending continued to grow annually in real terms at a faster rate 
than in any five-year period since 1979. 
Unlike the United Kingdom or Japan, Canadian objectives for controlling 
public spending were in the early  1980s expressed more vaguely, normally 
without precise targets and dates for achievement. The Trudeau Government 
had pledged to hold the growth of  spending of  the federal budget to that of 
GNP and to reduce the deficit, and this had been achieved by  1978. However, 
after reelection, the recession of  1981-82  led to a rapid deterioration in federal 
finances, and from 1980-84,  federal spending was rising above the trend line 
of GDP. From 1975-76  to 1982-83  federal spending as a proportion of GDP 
increased by  3.2 percent, and for the whole of  the period to 1989-90,  by  an 
average of  10.4 percent per annum. Spending increased from 1987, deficits 
increased for five consecutive years from 1989 to 1993, and with higher inter- 
est rates, the costs of servicing the growing debt grew rapidly. Numerical tar- 
gets for the progressive reduction of the deficit were prescribed annually in the 
federal budget, and revised as they were missed. But from 1994, federal spend- 
ing and the deficit appeared to be set on a downward trend, and the medium- 
term objective of achieving a balanced budget a practical proposition. Canada’s 
achievement of its fiscal objectives, both short-term control of the capped bud- 
get aggregate and the progressive reduction of the budget deficit and debt over 
the medium-term period were unmatched by  either the United  Kingdom or 
Japan or by other G7 countries. It is perhaps too early to say whether the appar- 
ent success of  the last three years will endure and be sustained through the 
business and electoral cycles. But thus far, the federal government has treated 
not only the symptoms of  fiscal stress, persistent deficit and rising debt, but 
through real cuts in programs and operating budgets begun to remedy the main 
cause of that stress, the growth of federal spending. 
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